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Abstract
In this paper we study the implications of population ageing in an economy with a sizeable
non-traded goods sector. To this effect a highly stylized micro-founded macro model is
constructed in which the age structure of the population plays a non-trivial role. The
model distinguishes separate birth and death probabilities (thus allowing for net pop-
ulation change), allows for age-dependent labour productivity (thus mimicing life-cycle
saving), and includes a rudimentary pension system (thus allowing for intergenerational
redistribution). The model is used to analytically study demographic and pension shocks.
JEL codes: D91, E13, F41, H55. Keywords: fertility rate, overlapping generations,
pension reform, demographic shocks, non-traded goods.
1 Introduction
The western world is ageing rapidly. As was recently argued by Lee (2003), the ageing process
since the postwar period can be attributed both to increased longevity and reduced fertility.
As a result, the population share of elderly people has increased dramatically. For example,
for the countries comprising the Most Developed Regions, the old-age dependency ratio1 was
12% in 1950, 21% in 2000, and is projected to increase to 44% in 2050—see United Nations
(2003). Between the Most Developed Regions countries there is quite a lot of variation. For
example, Japan had an old-age dependency ratio in 2000 of only 25% but this ratio is expected
to rise to 72% by 2050. For a number of small open European economies the corresponding
figures are: Belgium (from 26% to 47%), Germany (from 24% to 49%), Italy (from 27% to
∗Erasmus University, P.O. Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands. Phone: +31-10-408-1808,
E-mail: bettendorf@few.eur.nl.
♯Department of Economics, University of Groningen, P.O. Box 800, 9700 AV Groningen, The Netherlands.
Phone: +31-50-363-7303, Fax: +31-50-363-7337, E-mail: b.j.heijdra@eco.rug.nl.
1The old-age dependency ratio is defined as the ratio of the elderly population (65+ years) to the working-
age (15-64 years) population.
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265%), and the Netherlands (from 20% to 42%). The figures for the United States are less
drastic but still noticeable (from 19% in 2000 to 32% in 2050).
It is widely believed that demographic changes of such order of magnitude will have
profound and long-lasting economic effects, both on the world as a whole and on individual
countries. This paper focuses on the second issue by posing the question: How will small
open economies be affected by ageing? We answer this question in two steps. First, we
analyze the macroeconomic effects of various (pure and composite) demographic shocks in a
model of a small open economy with a non-traded goods sector. We show how changes in the
demography influence capital accumulation, household consumption, aggregate output, and
economic growth, both at impact, during transition, and in the long run.
In the second step, we study the macroeconomic and welfare effects of pension reform.
Many western countries rely heavily on unfunded pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems
which may become untenable due to the ageing process. Of course, in the absence of Ricardian
equivalence, PAYG systems are equivalent to government debt and their reform will therefore
exert significant intergenerational effects. Simply put, both explicit and implicit public debt
represent an intergenerational burden in such a setting.
In contrast with the vast majority of studies on population ageing, we employ an analyt-
ical framework which is simple and flexible enough to establish our results.2 The advantage
of doing so is that we are thus able to highlight the key economic mechanisms by which
ageing and pension reform exert their influence on the economy.3 Our analysis makes use of
modelling insights from two main bodies of literature. First, in order to allow for overlapping
generations (OG) and the possibility of Ricardian non-equivalence, we employ the framework
originally developed by Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985), and further extended by Buiter
(1988), Giovannini (1988), Weil (1989), and Bovenberg (1993). In this framework, potentially
disconnected generations are born at each instant and all agents face a constant probability
of death. By distinguishing birth and death rates, the model is suitable to study demographic
shocks both with and without Ricardian equivalence. We enrich the OG framework by allow-
ing for age-dependent productivity (to capture the notion of “saving for a rainy day”) and by
including a simple PAYG pension system.4
The second key building block of our analysis concerns the body of assumptions regarding
international trade in goods and the mobility of physical and financial assets. In accordance
with the literature we abstract from capital market constraints and assume that financial
assets are perfectly mobile internationally. This means that the world interest rate, mea-
sured in terms of the traded good, is constant. Since small open economies often have a
2Most studies on population ageing employ dynamic calibrated computable general equilibrium (CGE)
models in the style of Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). See, for example, Hubbard and Judd (1987), Auerbach
et al. (1989), Cutler et al. (1990), Auerbach, Cai and Kotlikoff (1991), and Broer (2001).
3Like Gertler (1999) we do not consider our approach to be a substitute for large-scale numerical simulation
models, but rather to be supplementary to such models.
4This pension system is similar to the one suggested by Nielsen (1994).
3sizeable non-traded sector, we follow Turnovsky (1997, ch. 4) by distinguishing two sepa-
rate production sectors. The traded (or non-sheltered) sector produces an internationally
traded good whose price is set in world markets. In contrast, the non-traded sector produces
only for home absorption, and as a result the real exchange rate is determined endogenously
within the model. We abstract from international physical capital mobility by assuming that
only non-traded goods are used for investment purposes. This approach implies economy-
wide adjustment costs of investment due to the increasing marginal cost of production in the
non-traded sector.5
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model and
demonstrate its main properties. The model is saddle-point stable, but the relative capital
intensity of the two sectors determines qualitatively the form of the transitional dynamics
in the real exchange rate. Indeed, in the empirically relevant core case, in which the non-
traded sector is relatively labour intensive, there is no transitional dynamics in the real
exchange rate at all! In the remainder of the paper we restrict attention on this core case.
In Section 3, we discuss the macroeconomic effects of composite demographic shocks. In the
first of such shocks, there is a proportionate fall in the fertility and death rates so as to
yield a stationary population growth rate. Under this scenario, there is an investment boom
during the early phases of adjustment but capital crowding out (due to increased consumption
of non-tradeables) in the long run. The second scenario consists of a drop in the fertility
rate accompanied by an increase in the death rates so as to keep the rate of generational
turnover constant but to reduce the population growth rate. Per capita consumption and
financial assets both rise monotonically, but the impact and long-run effects on investment
are ambiguous and depend critically on the severity of the adjustment costs (i.e. on the share
of non-traded goods consumption).
In the remainder of Section 3 we study two types of pension reform, namely a decrease in
the pension benefit and an increase in the retirement age (both accompanied by a reduction
in the pension premium to balance the budget of the PAYG system). For the relevant case,
with the interest rate exceeding the rate of population growth (the so-called Aaron condition),
the reform leads to long-run increases in consumption and financial assets but a decrease in
the capital stock. Again, this long-run crowding out of capital occurs because consumption
of non-traded goods increases.
In Section 4 we study the intergenerational welfare effects for the two types of pension
reform. We assume that the Aaron condition holds. For the pension reduction we obtain the
usual result that the oldest of those generations alive at the time of the shock loose out as a
result of it.6 An increase in the pension age leaves pensioners unaffected and makes future
generations strictly better off. The oldest of the working-age generations bear the brunt of the
5See also van Wincoop (1993), Brock and Turnovky (1994), Turnovsky (1997, p. 104), and Hsieh, Chang,
and Lai (1998).
6This result is familiar from the standard two-generation Diamond (1965) model.
4reform. We close this section by developing simple conditions (involving structural economic
and demographic parameters) under which majoritarian pension reform is feasible.
Finally, in Section 5 we present some concluding thoughts and give some suggestions for
future research.
2 The model
2.1 Households
2.1.1 Individual households
The utility functional in period t of the representative agent born at time v is denoted by
Λ(v, t) and takes the following form:7
Λ(v, t) ≡
∫
∞
t
[
c¯ (v, τ)1−1/σU − 1
1− 1/σU
]
e(ρ+β)(t−τ)dτ, (2.1)
where c¯ is a composite consumption good (see below), σU is the intertemporal substitution
elasticity (σU ≥ 0), ρ is the pure rate of time preference (ρ > 0), and β is the instantaneous
probability of death (β ≥ 0). Following Armington (1969) we assume that composite con-
sumption is a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) aggregate of traded and non-traded
goods (c¯T and c¯N , respectively):
c¯ (v, τ) ≡
[
εC c¯
T (v, τ)(σC−1)/σC + (1− εC)c¯
N (v, τ)(σC−1)/σC
]σC/(σC−1)
, (2.2)
where σC is the so-called Armington elasticity of substitution between the two types of goods.
It is assumed that 0 ≤ σC ≪∞, i.e. the goods are imperfect substitutes in consumption.
The household budget identity, expressed in terms of the traded good, is given by:
˙¯a (v, τ) =
(
rF + β
)
a¯ (v, τ) +
(
WIN (v, τ)
P T (τ)
)
− c¯T (v, τ)−
(
PN (τ)
P T (τ)
)
c¯N (v, τ) , (2.3)
where rF is the exogenously given (constant) world rate of interest, WIN (v, τ) is age-
dependent non-interest income net of lump-sum taxes/transfers (see below), P T and PN
denote, respectively, the price of traded and non-traded goods, and a¯ (v, τ) is real financial
wealth of the household. The return βa¯ is the actuarially fair annuity paid by the competi-
tive life insurance company—see Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985). A dot above a variable
denotes that variable’s time rate of change, e.g. ˙¯a (v, τ) ≡ da¯(v, τ)/dτ .
Financial wealth can be held in the form of capital goods (k¯), domestic government bonds
(a¯G), or foreign bonds (a¯F ). The first two assets are denominated in terms of non-traded
7Variables with a bar overstrike apply to individual households. All derivations are documented in a separate
Mathematical Appendix (see Bettendorf and Heijdra, 2004). Some key results are derived in the Appendix to
the paper.
5goods so real financial wealth is:
a¯ (v, τ) ≡
(
PN (τ)
P T (τ)
)[
k¯ (v, τ) + a¯G (v, τ)
]
+ a¯F (v, τ) . (2.4)
Following Nielsen (1994), we assume that the government maintains the following PAYG
pension scheme. Young households, with ages ranging from zero (newborns) to π pay a lump-
sum tax equal to T¯W (τ) ≡ t¯WP
T (τ). In contrast, old households, with ages ranging from
π to infinity, receive a lump-sum transfer of Z¯R (τ) ≡ z¯RP
T (τ). This scheme is run on a
balanced-budget basis (see below). We shall refer to π somewhat loosely as the retirement
age.8 Under these assumptions, non-interest income takes the following form:
WIN (v, τ)
P T (τ)
=


(1− tL)
WN (v,τ)
PT (τ)
− t¯W for τ − v ≤ π
(1− tL)
WN (v,τ)
PT (τ)
+ z¯R for τ − v > π
, (2.5)
where tL is a proportional labour income tax and W
N (v, τ) is the wage received at time τ by
a worker born in period v. The age-dependency of the wage rate results from the fact that
labour productivity is age-dependent.
The age-dependency of labour productivity is modelled as follows. The efficiency units of
labour supplied by a household of generation v at time τ is denoted by n¯ (v, τ) and can be
written as follows:
n¯ (v, τ) ≡ E (τ − v) l¯ (v, τ) , (2.6)
where l¯ (v, τ) = 1 is raw labour hours and E (τ − v) is the efficiency index. Following Blan-
chard (1985, pp. 235-238) we assume that the efficiency index falls exponentially with the
age of the household:
E (τ − v) = ω0e
−α(τ−v), (2.7)
where ω0 is some positive constant and α (> 0) regulates the speed at which efficiency falls
with age. According to (2.7), a 20-year old worker is e10α times as productive as a 30-year
old colleague.
In the planning period t, the household chooses paths for traded and non-traded goods
consumption and for financial assets in order to maximize lifetime utility (2.1) subject to the
flow budget identity (2.3) and a solvency condition, taking as given its initial level of financial
assets a¯(v, t). We solve the household decision problem by means of two-stage budgeting.
8Note that households do not actually retire from the labour force—surviving households of all ages in-
elastically supply a single unit of raw labour throughout their lives (see also below). Gertler (1999) models
exogenous but stochastic retirement as a two-stage Poisson process. In his model, agents face a random
transition from work to retirement and subsequently from retirement to death.
6In the first stage we define full consumption, x¯, as the sum of spending on traded and
non-traded consumption goods:
x¯ (v, τ) ≡ c¯T (v, τ) +
(
PN (τ)
P T (τ)
)
c¯N (v, τ) . (2.8)
In the planning period the household allocates a proportion9 of its total wealth to full con-
sumption:
x¯(v, t) = [∆(t)]−1
[
a¯(v, t) + a¯H(v, t)
]
, (2.9)
∆(t) ≡
∫
∞
t
(
PC(τ)
PC(t)
)1−σU
e[(1−σU )(r
F+β)+σU (ρ+β)](t−τ)dτ, (2.10)
where PC is the true price index for composite consumption c¯,
10 and where a¯H is human
wealth:
a¯H(v, t) ≡
∫
∞
t
(
WIN (v, τ)
P T (τ)
)
e(r
F+β)(t−τ)dτ. (2.11)
Human wealth represents the present discounted value of after-tax non-interest income (i.e.
the value of the time endowment), using the annuity rate of interest for discounting. An
alternative characterization of the household’s optimal dynamic plans makes use of the Euler
equation for full consumption which can be written as follows:
˙¯x (v, t)
x¯ (v, t)
−
P˙C (t)
PC (t)
= σU
(
rF −
P˙C (t)
PC (t)
− ρ
)
. (2.12)
The left-hand side of this expression represents the optimal growth rate of composite con-
sumption, ˙¯c (v, t) /c¯ (v, t). The slope of this time profile depends in the usual manner on
the magnitude of the intertemporal substitution elasticity, σU , and on the gap between the
“consumption rate of interest” and the rate of pure time preference. In the logarithmic case
(with σU = 1), the inflation rate in the true price index for composite consumption drops out
of (2.12) and the time profile of full consumption is proportional to rF − ρ.
In the second stage, consumption of traded and of non-traded goods are related to the
level of full consumption. The key expressions are:
c¯T (v, t) = [1− ωN (t)] x¯(v, t), (2.13)(
PN (t)
P T (t)
)
c¯N (v, t) = ωN (t)x¯(v, t), (2.14)
9Note that if we let σU → 1 in (2.1), then U is logarithmic and the full consumption propensity simplifies
to ∆−1 = ρ+ β.
10This true price index is defined as follows:
PC(t) ≡
(εC)
σC + (1− εC)
σC P
N (t)
PT (t)
1−σC
1/(1−σC)
for σC 6= 1
1
εC
εC PN (t)
(1−εC)P
T (t)
1−εC
for σC = 1
7where ωN is a complicated function of the relative price of non-traded goods.
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2.1.2 Demography
In order to allow for non-zero population growth, we employ the analytical framework devel-
oped by Buiter (1988). This framework distinguishes the probability of death β (≥ 0) and
the birth rate η (> 0) and thus allows for net population growth or decline. We denote the
population size at time t by L(t). In the absence of international migration, the growth rate
of the population, nL, is equal to the difference between the birth and death rates:
12
L˙(t)
L(t)
= η − β ≡ nL. (2.15)
By solving (2.15) subject to the initial condition L(0) = 1, we find the path for the aggregate
population:
L(t) = enLt. (2.16)
The size of a newborn generation is assumed to be proportional to the current population:
L(v, v) = ηL(v). (2.17)
Since the death rate is constant and cohorts are assumed to be large, the size of each generation
falls exponentially according to:
L(v, t) = eβ(v−t)L(v, v), t ≥ v. (2.18)
By substituting (2.16) and (2.17) into (2.18) we finally obtain:13
L(v, t) = ηeηve−βt. (2.19)
Given this demographic structure, 1−e−ηπ represents the population fraction of young work-
ers (whose age is less than π) and e−ηπ is the population fraction of old workers (“pen-
sioners” whose age exceeds π). The old-age dependency ratio is thus given by dep (π) ≡
e−ηπ/ [1− e−ηπ], where ε ≡ −d ln dep (π) /d lnπ = ηπ/ (1− e−ηπ) > 1 is the elasticity of this
ratio with respect to the pension age.
11Note that ωN is defined as follows:
ωN (t) ≡
(1− εC)
σC PN (t)
1−σC
(εC)
σC [PT (t)]1−σC + (1− εC)σC [PN (t)]
1−σC
.
The key thing to note in (2.13)-(2.14) is that our homothetic preference structure rules out age effects in ωN (·).
Age-dependency cannot be incorporated as it would destroy the simple aggregation properties of the model.
12Below we shall allow β and η to be time-dependent. Age-dependency cannot be incorporated as it would
destroy the simple aggregation properties of the model.
13An attractive feature of the Buiter formulation is that it nests two influential OLG models as special cases.
Indeed, by setting η = β > 0 the Blanchard (1985) model is obtained and by setting η > 0 and β = 0 the Weil
(1989) model is obtained. In addition, the Buiter model nests the representative-agent model of Cutler et al.
(1990) if we set η = 0 (no disconnected generations) and β < 0 (positive intra-dynasty population growth).
See also Bovenberg (1993, p. 8, fn.3)
82.1.3 Aggregate household sector
Aggregate variables are calculated as the integral of the generation-specific values weighted
by the corresponding generation sizes. For example, aggregate full consumption, X(t), is
defined as:
X(t) ≡
∫ t
−∞
L(v, t)x¯(v, t)dv, (2.20)
where L (v, t) and x¯(v, t) are given in, respectively, (2.19) and (2.9). It follows that aggregate
full consumption can be written as:
X(t) = ∆(t)−1
[
A(t) +AH(t)
]
, (2.21)
where A(t) is aggregate financial wealth and AH(t) is aggregate human wealth.
The aggregate Euler equation for full consumption is obtained by differentiating (2.20)
with respect to time and noting (2.19):
X˙(t) =
∫ t
−∞
L(v, t) ˙¯x (v, t) dv + ηL(t)x¯(t, t)− βX(t). (2.22)
By substituting (2.12) into (2.22) and dividing by X (t) we obtain:
X˙(t)
X(t)
=
[
σU
[
rF − ρ
]
+ (1− σU )
P˙C (t)
PC (t)
]
+
[
ηL(t)x¯(t, t)− βX(t)
X(t)
]
. (2.23)
The first term in square brackets on the right-hand side is the growth rate of individual
full consumption ( ˙¯x (v, t) /x¯(v, t)) whilst the second term is the generational turnover term
which itself depends on the demographic parameters. Growth in aggregate full consumption
is boosted because of the arrival of new agents (who start to consume out of human wealth)
but it is slowed down by the death of a cross-section of the population.
In the Appendix we show that (2.23) can be simplified to:
X˙(t)
X(t)
= σU
[
rF − ρ
]
+ α+ nL + (1− σU )
P˙C (t)
PC (t)
−
ηγL (t) + (α+ η)A(t)
∆(t)X(t)
, (2.24)
where γ is a complicated term involving the parameters of the pension system:
γ
rF + α+ β
≡
(
e−βπ
1− e−ηπ
)(
z¯R
rF + β
)(
e−r
F π − e−nLπ
nL − rF
)
> 0. (2.25)
According to (2.24), aggregate full consumption growth differs from individual full consump-
tion growth for two main reasons. First, aggregate growth exceeds individual growth if there
is positive net population growth (i.e. if nL > 0) or if labour efficiency declines with age (i.e.
if α > 0). Second, aggregate growth falls short of individual growth if newborns consume
less than existing households because they are less wealthy (i.e. if A(t) > 0) or if there is a
pension system which redistributes from the young to the old (i.e. if z¯R > 0 and thus γ > 0).
9Intuitively, ηγ/
(
rF + α+ β
)
can be interpreted as the per capita deficit of the PAYG
pension system,14 i.e. the present value of future pension benefits minus tax payments of the
current living population, using the annuity rate of interest rF +β for discounting. Regardless
of the sign of rF − nL, the deficit term is positive. In the central case, with r
F > nL, the
group of working-age households experiences the PAYG system as a tax burden on their
human capital because they are forced to save at an implicit interest rate (nL) lower than
the market rate of return (rF ). Of course, pensioners no longer pay pension premiums so to
these generations the PAYG system adds to human wealth.15 The overall effect on γ of the
PAYG system is positive, i.e. it is equivalent to an implicit government debt left for future
disconnected generations (Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1987, pp. 149-150). For future reference,
we note that ηγ is increasing in z¯R and π and decreasing in η and β (see the Appendix).
Aggregate financial wealth is defined as A(t) ≡
∫ t
−∞
L(v, t)a¯(v, t)dv. By differentiating
this expression with respect to t and noting that a¯(t, t) = 0 (as newborns are born without
financial wealth) we find an expression for national saving:
A˙(t) = −βA(t) +
∫ t
−∞
L(v, t) ˙¯a(v, t)dv. (2.26)
By using (2.3) and (2.8) in (2.26) and simplifying we find:
A˙(t) = rFA(t) +
WIN (t)
P T (t)
−X (t) , (2.27)
where WIN (t) /P T (t) can be written as:
WIN (t)
P T (t)
≡
(
ηω0
α+ η
)
(1− tL)FN
[
kT (τ), 1
]
L(t), (2.28)
and where FN
[
kT (τ), 1
]
is the marginal product of labour in the traded goods sector (see
equation (2.35) below). It follows from (2.27) that aggregate saving, unlike individual saving,
does not feature the death rate, β. The annuity payments are simply transfers, via the life
insurance companies, from households which pass away to households who continue to enjoy
life.
Aggregate labour supply, measured in efficiency units, is obtained by using (2.6), (2.7),
and (2.19):
N(t) ≡
∫ t
−∞
L(v, t)n¯(v, t)dv =
(
ηω0
α+ η
)
L (t) , (2.29)
where we have used (2.16) in the final step. Labour supply in efficiency units is proportional
to the population. The factor of proportionality depends on labour efficiency at birth (ω0) and
on the birth rate relative to the rate of decline of labour efficiency (η/ (α+ η)). Intuitively, if
the birth rate is high then the proportionality factor is high as the young productive workers
dominate in the effective labour supply.
14This term was coined by Kotlikoff (1979, p. 240).
15In the opposite case, with rF < nL, the PAYG system forms a net addition to the human wealth of all
current generations.
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2.2 Firms
There are two production sectors in the economy, namely a sector producing internationally
traded goods and one producing non-traded goods. Domestic firms in a given sector use capital
and (efficiency units of) labour to produce a homogeneous good under constant returns to
scale. In view of this assumption, it is appropriate to study representative firms in the two
sectors.
Two features of our model warrant further comment. First, in order to obtain non-
degenerate capital stock dynamics, we assume that the capital stock is constructed from
non-traded goods only. As is pointed out by Turnovsky (1997, p. 104), the rate of invest-
ment remains finite in this case because the supply of non-traded goods exhibits increasing
marginal costs.16 Second, we follow the literature by assuming that both capital and labour
are perfectly mobile across sectors and thus attract the same rental rates in both sectors.
2.2.1 Non-traded sector
Output in the non-traded sector, Y N , is produced according to the technology Y N (t) =
H
[
KN (t), NN (t)
]
, where KN and NN denote, respectively, capital and efficiency units of
labour used in the non-traded goods sector. The production function features constant re-
turns to scale, positive but diminishing marginal products to both factors, and a constant
substitution elasticity σN . Efficiency units of labour are defined according to N
N (t) ≡∫ t
−∞
E (t− v)LN (v, t) dv, where LN (v, t) is the number of workers of vintage v employed in
the non-traded goods sector. The firm rents labour and capital and operating profit is defined
as follows:
ΠN (t) ≡ PN (t)Y N (t)−
∫ t
−∞
WN (v, t)LN (v, t) dv −WK(t)KN (t), (2.30)
where WK (t) is the rental rate on capital and WN (v, t) denotes the wage for a worker of
vintage v at time t. The first-order conditions characterizing the firm’s optimal plans are:
HK
[
kN (t), 1
]
=
WK(t)
PN (t)
, (2.31)
E (t− v)HN
[
kN (t), 1
]
=
WN (v, t)
PN (t)
, (2.32)
where kN (t) ≡ KN (t) /NN (t) is the capital-effective-labour ratio in the non-traded goods
sector. In view of (2.7) and (2.32), it follows that for a given value of kN (t), the real wage
16Brock and Turnovsky (1994) demonstrate that our emphasis on non-traded investment goods does not
entail much loss of generality. In a more general model, with both types of goods acting as components of
a composite investment good, the fundamental dynamic characteristics of the model are essentially the same
as in the present model. With traded (components of) investment goods, and in the absence of firm-level
adjustment costs, the capital stock can jump so the (derivative) dynamics of the current account is different
than in our model.
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rate declines exponentially with the age of the worker. Since technology features constant
returns to scale, factor payments exhaust revenue and pure profits are zero (ΠN (t) = 0).
2.2.2 Traded sector
The specification of the traded sector is similar to that in the non-traded sector. Technology
is given by Y T (t) = F
[
KT (t), NT (t)
]
, where Y T , KT , and NT denote, respectively, output,
capital, and efficiency units of labour in the traded goods sector. We denote the constant
substitution elasticity of the production function by σT . Labour in efficiency units is defined
as NT (t) ≡
∫ t
−∞
E (t− v)LT (v, t) dv, where LT (v, t) is the number of workers of vintage v
employed in the traded goods sector. Profit in this sector is given by:
ΠT (t) ≡ P T (t)Y T (t)−
∫ t
−∞
WN (v, t)LT (v, t) dv −WK(t)KT (t), (2.33)
where we have incorporated the assumption that capital and labour are mobile across sectors
(i.e. WN (v, t) and WK (t) are the same in (2.30) and (2.33)). The first-order conditions are
given by:
FK
[
kT (t), 1
]
=
WK (t)
P T (t)
, (2.34)
E (t− v)FN
[
kT (t), 1
]
=
WN (v, t)
P T (t)
, (2.35)
where kT (t) ≡ KT (t) /NT (t) is the capital-effective-labour ratio in the traded goods sector.
Pure profits are zero (ΠT (t) = 0).
2.3 Portfolio investments
There are three assets in the economy, namely (claims on) domestic capital goods, domestic
government bonds, and foreign bonds. We look at these assets in turn. The portfolio investor
chooses its capital accumulation decision by maximizing the present value of cash flows from
its capital stock. This cash flow (expressed in terms of non-traded goods) is given by:
V N (t)
PN (t)
=
∫
∞
t
[(
WK(τ)
PN (τ)
)
K(τ)− IN (τ)
]
e−R
N (t,τ)dτ, (2.36)
where IN is gross investment (consisting of non-traded goods) and RN (t, τ) ≡
∫ τ
t r
N (s)ds is
a discounting factor. The capital accumulation identity is:
K˙(τ) = IN (τ)− δK(τ), (2.37)
where δ > 0 is the constant depreciation rate of capital. The investor chooses paths for gross
investment and the capital stock in order to maximize (2.36) subject to (2.37) and taking as
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given the initial capital stock (K(t)) and the path of the rental rate (WK(τ)). The first-order
condition for this optimization problem is:
WK(t)
PN (t)
= rN (t) + δ. (2.38)
It is not difficult to show that V N (t) = PN (t)K(t).
Government bonds are denominated in terms of non-traded goods and carry a real yield
of rG(t). Portfolio investors are indifferent between government bonds and physical capital if
(and only if) they attract the same rate of return:
rG(t) = rN (t). (2.39)
Foreign bonds are denominated in terms of traded goods and carry a real yield of rF
(fixed in world markets and exogenous to domestic investors). Portfolio investors are indif-
ferent between, on the one hand foreign bonds and, on the other hand, domestic capital and
government bonds if (and only if) their rates of return (measured in the same units) are
equalized. This furnishes the final no-arbitrage condition:
rN (t) = rF +
P˙ T (t)
P T (t)
−
P˙N (t)
PN (t)
. (2.40)
2.4 Loose ends
The sectoral allocation of labour and capital services is as follows. Since both factors are
perfectly mobile across sectors it follows that they attract the same rental rates. Indeed, by
using (2.32) and (2.35) for labour, and (2.31) and (2.34) for capital we obtain:
WN (t)
[
≡
WN (v, t)
E (t− v)
]
= PN (t)HN
[
kN (t), 1
]
= P T (t)FN
[
kT (t), 1
]
(2.41)
WK (t) = PN (t)HK
[
kN (t), 1
]
= P T (t)FK
[
kT (t), 1
]
(2.42)
where WN (t) is the wage rate per efficiency unit of labour.
Since government bonds are denominated in terms of non-traded goods, the government
budget identity is given by:
A˙G(t) = rN (t)AG(t) +
P T (t)GT (t)
PN (t)
+GN (t)−
tL (t)W
N (t)N (t)
PN (t)
, (2.43)
where rN (t) denotes the real rate of interest on government bonds (see (2.39)), AG is aggregate
government debt, and Gi is government consumption of sector-i goods. The government
solvency condition is:
lim
τ→∞
AG(τ)e−R
N (t,τ) = 0. (2.44)
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Combining (2.43) and (2.44) yields the government intertemporal budget constraint:
AG(t) =
∫
∞
t
[
tL (τ)W
N (τ)N (τ)− P T (τ)GT (τ)
PN (τ)
−GN (τ)
]
e−R
N (t,τ)dτ. (2.45)
To the extent that there is outstanding debt (positive left-hand side), this must be matched
by the present value of present and future primary surpluses (positive right-hand side).
Note that the PAYG pension system does not affect the government financial accounts
(as represented in (2.43) and (2.45)) because it is run on a balanced-budget basis, i.e. t¯W and
z¯R are such that:
t¯W
(
1− e−ηπ
)
L (t) = z¯Re
−ηπL (t) , (2.46)
where the left-hand side of (2.46) represents total pension payments by the young, and the
right-hand side is total pension receipts by the old. In this paper we follow Nielsen (1994)
and restrict attention to the defined-benefit case, i.e. following any shock in η or π, z¯R is held
constant and the pension budget is balanced by an adjustment in t¯W .
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Foreign bonds are denominated in terms of traded goods. The current account is thus:
A˙F (t) = rFAF (t) + Y T (t)− CT (t)−GT (t), (2.47)
where AF (t) denotes the stock of foreign bonds in the hands of domestic households.
The model is closed by the clearing conditions in, respectively, the labour market, the
capital rental market, and the non-traded goods market:
N(t) = NN (t) +NT (t), (2.48)
K (t) = KN (t) +KT (t), (2.49)
Y N (t) = CN (t) + IN (t) +GN (t). (2.50)
The country is small in world markets and faces a given price for traded goods. We can thus
set:
P T (t) = 1,
P˙ T (t)
P T (t)
= 0, for all t, (2.51)
so that PN (t) represents the real exchange rate. An increase in PN will be referred to a real
appreciation.
2.5 Full model
In the presence of non-zero population growth, the model gives rise to ongoing economic
growth. In order to study the growth process, we rewrite the model in a stationary format
by expressing all growing variables in per capita terms. The key equations of the full model
17Note that (2.46) has already been incorporated in (2.25).
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are stated in Table 1, whilst the variable definitions are stated in Table 2. The endogenous
variables are PN , WN , WK , k, n, x, a, aF , γ, ∆, ωN , PC , k
i, ni, yi, ci (for i = N,T ). The
exogenous variables are gi (for i = N,T ), rF , aG, β, η, π, z¯R, and tL.
18 We demonstrate
below that the model is saddle-point stable, with two predetermined state variables (k and
aF ) and three non-predetermined “jumping” state variables (PN , x, and ∆).
We briefly discuss the equations in Table 1, starting with the dynamic ones. Equation
(T1.1) is obtained by combining (2.38) and (2.40). Intuitively, equation (T1.1) says that the
instantaneous return on non-traded capital (consisting of a rental payment plus an appreci-
ation term) must equal the rate of return on a traded bond. The real exchange rate thus
plays a dual role: it must clear the non-traded goods market and it serves as an asset price
(Turnovsky, 1997, p. 112). Equation (T1.2) is the accumulation equation for the per capita
stock of capital. It is obtained by combining (2.37) and (2.50). Equation (T1.3) shows the
optimum time path of per capita full consumption. It is obtained by expressing (2.24) in per
capita format. Equation (T1.4) is the macroeconomic accumulation equation for per capita
net foreign assets and is obtained by expressing (2.47) in per capita format. Finally, equation
(T1.5), describing the dynamic behaviour of ∆ (t), is obtained by differentiating (2.10) with
respect to time.
Equations (T1.6)-(T1.20) are essentially static equations, in the sense that they can be
related uniquely to the endogenous state variables and the exogenous variables of the model.
Equations (T1.6) and (T1.7) are the intensive-form production functions in, respectively,
the traded and non-traded sector.19 Equations (T1.8)-(T1.9) are obtained by rewriting the
expressions in (2.41) in the intensive form. Similarly, equations (T1.10)-(T1.11) are obtained
from (2.42). Equations (T1.12) and (T1.13) are obtained from, respectively, (2.48) and (2.49).
Equation (T1.14) is (2.29) in per capita form. Equations (T1.15)-(T1.16) and (T1.18) are
obtained from, respectively, (2.13)-(2.14) and (2.4). Finally, equation (T1.17) is identical to
(2.25). Of course, in various places we have incorporated the normalization (2.51).
2.6 Main properties
Before turning to the dynamic analysis of the model, we first characterize its steady state.
We denote steady-state values of endogenous variables by a hat (ˆ). By imposing the steady
state in (T1.1) and noting (T1.11) we find that the foreign interest rate pins down a unique
18The government budget identity can be written in per capita terms as follows:
a˙
G(t) = rF − nL −
P˙N (t)
PN (t)
a
G(t) +
gT (t)− tL (t)W
N (t)n (t)
PN (t)
+ gN (t).
It is used either in its static form (by setting a˙G(t) = 0 and assuming that the lump-sum labour income
tax balances the budget) or in its dynamic form by imposing the (suitably modified) government solvency
condition (2.44).
19The reader is reminded of the key properties of the intensive-form production functions: f ≡ F kT , 1 ,
FK = f
′, FN = f − k
T f ′, h ≡ H kN , 1 , HK = h
′, and HN = h− k
Nh′.
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Table 1: Short-run version of the model(♯)
(a) Dynamic equations:
P˙N (t)
PN (t)
= rF + δ −
WK(t)
PN (t)
(T1.1)
k˙(t) = nN (t)yN (t)− cN (t)− gN (t)− (δ + nL) k(t) (T1.2)
x˙(t) =
[
σU
(
rF − ρ
)
+ α+ (1− σU )
P˙C (t)
PC (t)
]
x(t)−
ηγ + (α+ η) a(t)
∆(t)
(T1.3)
a˙F (t) =
(
rF − nL
)
aF (t) + nT (t)yT (t)− cT (t)− gT (t) (T1.4)
∆˙(t) = −1 +
[
(1− σU )
(
rF + β −
P˙C(t)
PC(t)
)
+ σU (ρ+ β)
]
∆(t) (T1.5)
(b) Static equations:
yT (t) = f
[
kT (t)
]
(T1.6)
yN (t) = h
[
kN (t)
]
(T1.7)
WN (t) = f
[
kT (t)
]
− kT (t)f ′
[
kT (t)
]
(T1.8)
WN (t) = PN (t)
[
h
[
kN (t)
]
− kN (t)h′
[
kN (t)
]]
(T1.9)
WK (t) = f ′
[
kT (t)
]
(T1.10)
WK (t) = PN (t)h′
[
kN (t)
]
(T1.11)
n(t) = nT (t) + nN (t) (T1.12)
k(t) = nT (t)kT (t) + nN (t)kN (t) (T1.13)
n(t) =
ηω0
α+ η
(T1.14)
cT (t) = [1− ωN (t)]x(t) (T1.15)
PN (t)cN (t) = ωN (t)x(t) (T1.16)
γ =
(
e−βpi
1− e−ηpi
)(
z¯R
rF + β
)(
rF + α+ β
)(e−rFpi − e−nLpi
nL − rF
)
(T1.17)
a (t) = PN (t)
[
k(t) + aG(t)
]
+ aF (t) (T1.18)
(c) Miscellaneous equations:
ωN (t) ≡ (1− εC)
σC
(
PN (t)
PC (t)
)1−σC
(T1.19)
PC(t) ≡


[
(εC)
σC + (1− εC)
σC
[
PN (t)
]1−σC]1/(1−σC)
for σC 6= 1(
1
εC
)εC (PN (t)
1−εC
)1−εC
for σC = 1
(T1.20)
(♯) See Table 2 for the variable definitions.
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Table 2: Key variable definitions
yi output per efficiency unit of labour in sector i (i = N,T )
ki capital per efficiency unit of labour in sector i (i = N,T )
k per capita capital stock
ni per capita efficiency units of labour in sector i (i = N,T )
n per capita labour supply in efficiency units of labour
PN product price in non-traded sector (real exchange rate)
WN rental rate on efficiency units of labour
WK rental rate on capital
rF world real interest rate
a per capita real financial wealth
aG per capita government debt
aF per capita foreign bonds
x per capita full consumption
t¯W real lump-sum tax paid by working-age households
z¯R real lump-sum transfer received by retired households
ci per capita household consumption of sector-i goods (i = N,T )
gi per capita government consumption of sector-i goods (i = N,T )
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capital intensity in the non-traded sector, i.e. rF + δ = h′
[
kˆN
]
. Equations (T1.8)-(T1.10)
then determine unique values for kˆT , WˆN , WˆK , and PˆN as a function of kˆN (and thus
ultimately of rF + δ). It follows from (T1.6)-(T1.7) that yˆT and yˆN are constant, and from
(T1.19)-(T1.20) that ωˆN and PˆC are constant in the steady state. The long-run factor price
frontier thus imposes a lot of fixity into the model.
Given the above considerations it should come as no surprise that demand shocks (such
as an increase in government consumption), demographic shocks (such as changes in η or
β), or pension shocks (changes in π or z¯R) will exert no long-run effect on kˆ
N , kˆT , yˆN , yˆT ,
WˆN , WˆK , PˆN , ωˆN and PˆC .
20 Such shocks may, of course, have temporary effects on these
variables provided the domestic interest rate deviates from the exogenous foreign interest rate
during transition.
The model possesses non-trivial transitional dynamics. There are two predetermined state
variables (k and aF ) and three non-predetermined “jumping” state variables (PN , x, and ∆).
The following proposition summarizes our main findings regarding transitional dynamics.
Proposition 1 Consider the model of Table 1 and assume that σU
(
rF − ρ
)
< η. The follow-
ing results can be established: (i) the model is locally saddle-point stable, i.e. the Jacobian ma-
trix features two negative (stable) characteristic roots and three positive (unstable) roots; (ii)
the capital stock features smooth transitional dynamics; (iii) there is no transitional dynamics
in the real exchange rate if the traded goods sector is relatively capital intensive (kT > kN );
(iv) the real exchange rate features non-trivial transitional dynamics if the non-traded sector
is relatively capital intensive (kN > kT ); (v) the long-run growth rate in the economy is equal
to nL ≡ η − β.
Proof: see Bettendorf and Heijdra (2004).
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this proposition is the fact that the qualitative shape
of the adjustment path for the real exchange rate depends critically on the relative capital
intensity in the traded and non-traded sectors. This property was also noted by Turnovsky
(1997, p. 112) in the context of a representative-agent model.21
20A productivity shock in either of the two productive sectors will, of course, affect these variables. See
Turnovsky (1997, pp. 105-123) for an extensive analysis of these points in the context of a model with an
infinitely-lived representative agent.
21Bond, Wang, and Yip (1996) show that the factor intensity condition similarly affects the transitional
dynamics in the relative price of human capital in the closed-economy two-sector endogenous growth model
with physical and human capital.
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3 The core model
3.1 Benchmark
The model in Table 1 is too complex to characterize analytically the impulse-response func-
tions associated with changes in demographic and pension-related variables. For that reason
we focus in the remainder of this paper on a benchmark case with the following key features.
First, we assume that the traded sector is relatively capital intensive (i.e. kT > kN ). This
is a rather natural assumption to make in view of the fact that a large part of the output
of the non-traded sector consists of labour-intensive services. Furthermore, this case pro-
vides additional analytical simplifications, in that there is no transitional dynamics in the
real exchange rate (see Proposition 1(iii) above). Second, to avoid unnecessary mathematical
complications, we set the various substitution elasticities appearing in the model equal to
unity, i.e. σU = σC = σN = σT = 1.
22 Third, in order to avoid having to go through a whole
taxonomy of cases admitted by our model, we restrict attention to the case which we find
empirically most relevant. In particular, we assume that households are relatively patient
(rF > ρ) and that the rate of population growth is relatively low (rF > nL).
The core model can be solved sequentially as follows. First, we can use (T1.8)-(T1.13) to
derive the following quasi-reduced-form expressions for WK/PN , WN , nN and yN :
WK (t)
PN (t)
= ωK [PN (t)
−
], (3.1)
WN (t) = WN [PN (t)
+
], (3.2)
nN (t) = n− nT (t) = nN [PN (t)
+
, k (t)
−
, n
+
], (3.3)
yN (t) = yN [PN (t)
+
], (3.4)
where the signs of the partial derivatives are as indicated.23
Using (3.1) in (T1.1) we find the following differential equation for the real exchange rate:
P˙N (t)
PN (t)
= rF + δ − ωK
[
PN (t)
]
. (3.5)
22These simplifications do not affect any of the qualitative conclusions of this section. Since there is no
transitional dynamics in the real exchange rate (P˙N = 0), it follows that P˙C = ∆˙ = ω˙N = 0 so that σU
and σC cannot play a role. The technological substitution elasticities (σN and σT ) only affect the adjustment
speed in the economy, but not the qualitative shape of the adjustment path, which is fully characterized by
the factor intensity assumption.
23The intuition behind these effects is well known from two-sector trade theory—see, e.g., Woodland (1982,
ch. 4). First, since the number of goods equals the number of factors, factor prices are independent of factor
supplies (factor price equalization). Second, an increase in PN will increase the return to the factor used
intensively in the non-traded sector (labour) and decrease the return on the other factor (Stolper-Samuelson
Theorem). Third, ceteris paribus PN , an increase in the supply of a factor will lead to an increase in the
output of the commodity that uses that factor intensively and a decrease in the output of the other good
(Rybczynski Theorem).
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Since ∂ωK/∂PN < 0, equation (3.5) is an unstable differential equation for which the only
economically sensible solution is the steady-state solution, i.e. it follows that P˙N (t) = 0 and
PN (t) = PˆN for all t.
In the second step we exploit the constancy of the real exchange rate and write the
remainder of the core model in the following parsimonious system of first-order differential
equations:
k˙ (t) = nN
[
PˆN , k (t) , n
]
yˆN − (1− εC)x (t) /Pˆ
N − gN − (δ + nL) k (t) , (3.6)
x˙ (t) =
(
rF − ρ+ α
)
x (t)− (ρ+ β) [ηγ + (α+ η) a (t)] , (3.7)
a˙ (t) =
(
rF − nL
)
a (t)− x (t) + (1− tL) Wˆ
Nn. (3.8)
Equations (3.6) and (3.7) are the simplified versions of, respectively, (T1.2) and (T1.3). Equa-
tion (3.8) is the dynamic expression for total financial wealth.24 The dynamic properties of
the core model can be illustrated with the aid of Figure 1. In the bottom panel, the k˙ (t) line
is the graphical representation of equation (3.6), holding constant the level of full consump-
tion. In view of the fact that ∂nN/∂k < 0, the k˙ (t) line is downward sloping and the capital
dynamics is stable and non-degenerate.
In the top panel of Figure 1, the equilibrium loci associated with the simultaneous system
(3.7)-(3.8) have been drawn. Since we assume that rF > ρ, it follows from (3.7) that the
x˙ (t) = 0 line is upward sloping, and that ∂x˙/∂x > 0, i.e. the vertical arrows point away
from the x˙ (t) = 0 line. Also, since we assume that rF > nL, the a˙ (t) = 0 line is also upward
sloping, and ∂a˙/∂a > 0, i.e. the horizontal arrows point away from the a˙ (t) = 0 line. It is
easy to verify that the subsystem is saddle-point stable provided the x˙ (t) = 0 line is steeper
than the a˙ (t) = 0 line.25
Armed with the graphical apparatus of Figure 1, we can now investigate the impact, tran-
sitional, and long-run effects of various shocks in demographic and pension-related variables.
In all these shocks we hold the per capita debt level of the government constant (a˙G (t) = 0)
and assume that the labour income tax balances the budget.
3.2 Demographic shocks
In this sub-section we study the macroeconomic effects of demographic shocks. To keep things
simple, we abstract from a pre-existing pension system, i.e. we set z¯R = 0 so that γ = 0 in the
24It is obtained by differentiating (T1.18) with respect to time and using the various expressions for P˙N (t),
k˙ (t), a˙F (t), a˙G (t), as well as the zero-profit conditions in the two sectors.
25The determinant of the Jacobian matrix equals:
|J | ≡ rF − η + β rF − ρ+ α − (ρ+ β) (α+ η)
= rF − η − ρ rF + α+ β .
It follows that rF − ρ − η < 0 is a necessary (and sufficient) stability condition. See also Proposition 1,
specialized for the case σU = 1.
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Figure 1: Stability in the Core Model
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dynamic equation for full consumption—see equation (3.7) above. Changes in demographic
parameters cause quite diverse effects on the structure of the economy. For example, a change
in the birth rate (η) has three separate effects. First, it changes the generational turnover
term and thus affects the modified Euler equation for full consumption (3.7). Second, it leads
to a change in the population growth rate (nL ≡ η − β), which in turn affects both the
net investment equation (3.6) and the asset accumulation equation (3.8). Third, with age-
dependent labour productivity (α > 0), it changes the macroeconomic participation rate—see
equation (T1.14) above. This, in turn, affects both the sectoral allocation of labour (nN and
nT ) and the aggregate level of wage income (WˆNn). In contrast, a change in the death
probability (β) affects population growth and the generational turnover term, but leaves the
macroeconomic participation rate unchanged.
For purposes of exposition we abstract from age-dependent labour productivity in this
sub-section (by setting α = 0) and study composite demographic shocks. This approach
allows us to study in isolation the macroeconomic effects of (a) changes in the generational
turnover term and (b) changes in the population growth rate.
3.2.1 Generational turnover
The first composite demographic shock we consider is an equal decline in the birth rate and
the death probability, i.e. dη = dβ < 0. The population growth rate is unaffected (dnL = 0),
but the generational turnover term appearing in (3.7) increases. The impact, transitional, and
long-run effects of the shock have been illustrated in Figure 2. The initial equilibrium is at
point E0 in the two panels. As a result of the shock, the x˙ (t) = 0 rotates in a clockwise fashion,
from [x˙ (t) = 0]old to [x˙ (t) = 0]new , but the a˙ (t) = 0 line remains in the same position because
nothing has happened to the population growth rate (by construction) or the macroeconomic
participation rate (because α = 0). At impact, the economy jumps from E0 to point A on
the new saddle path SP. Intuitively, the fall in full consumption at impact results from the
interplay of two opposing effects.26 On the one hand, human wealth rises due the fact that
the annuity rate of interest, rF +β, falls so that the present value of after-tax wages increases.
On the other hand, all households expect to live longer lives and thus reduce the marginal
propensity to consume out of total wealth on that account. The latter effect dominates the
former effect so that full consumption falls.
In the bottom panel of Figure 2, the capital accumulation line shifts up at impact, from
[k˙ (t)]old to [k˙ (t)]impact , because consumption of non-traded goods declines. The output in
the non-traded sector which is thus freed up leads to net capital accumulation, i.e. k˙ (t) > 0
26Recall that for the case under consideration, full consumption can be written as:
x (t) = (ρ+ β) a (t) + aH (t) .
At impact, financial assets are predetermined (since P˙N (t) = 0 precludes asset revaluation effects) so that the
impact change in full consumption results from the changes in ρ+ β and in aH .
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at point A.
During transition the economy gradually moves from point A to point E1 in the top panel.
Full consumption and financial assets both increase over time. Consumption of non-tradeable
goods gradually rises and in the bottom panel of Figure 2 the capital accumulation line starts
to shift to the left (not drawn). This slows down net capital accumulation and, as time
evolves, the capital stock even starts to decline.
In the new steady state the economy settles at point E1 in the two panels of Figure 2.
Both full consumption and financial assets increase, but the domestic capital stock decreases
in the long run. It follows (from (T1.18) above) that the stock of net foreign assets also
increases in the long run. We summarize the results in the following propositions.
Proposition 2 Consider the core model (with α = γ = 0) and assume that dη = dβ < 0.
The following results can be established: (i) at impact, x, cT , and cN fall, a, k, and aF are
unchanged, and x˙ and k˙ increase; (ii) during transition, x, cT , and cN rise monotonically,
but following its initial increase, k starts to decline during the later phases of adjustment;
(iii) in the new steady state, x, cT , cN and aF are all increased, but k is decreased; (iv) the
path for per capita output in the traded (non-traded) sector is qualitatively the same as (the
opposite of) the path for k; (v) real per capita GDP is defined as y (t) ≡ WˆNn + WˆKk (t)
and its path is proportional to the path for k; (vi) the long-run growth rate in the economy is
unchanged.
Proof: see text and Bettendorf and Heijdra (2004).
3.2.2 Population growth
The second composite demographic shock consists of a decline in the birth rate combined with
an increase in the death probability such that the generational turnover effect is unchanged.
It follows from (3.7) that the shock is such that −ηdβ = (ρ+ β) dη < 0 so that ηdnL =
(η + ρ+ β) dη < 0. In Figure 3 we illustrate the macroeconomic effects of such a decline
in the population growth rate. As a result of the shock, the [a˙ (t) = 0] line rotates in a
counter-clockwise fashion, from [a˙ (t) = 0]old to [a˙ (t) = 0]new , but the [x˙ (t) = 0] line remains
in the same position because (by construction) the generational turnover effect is unchanged.
At impact, the economy jumps onto the new saddle path SP and consumption is increased.
Though per capita human wealth falls (due to the higher annuity rate of interest, rF + β),
the shorter expected lifetime induces agents to increase their propensity to consume out of
total wealth, ρ + β. Since the latter effect dominates the former, full consumption increases
at impact.
In the bottom panel of Figure 3, there are two mechanisms affecting the position of the
k˙ (t) line. On the one hand, the impact increase in consumption of non-traded goods crowds
out net investment and shifts the k˙ (t) line in a downward direction. On the other hand, the
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decline in the population growth rate makes room for additional net investment (an upward
shift). We show in the Appendix that the following condition can be derived for the impact
effect on net investment:27
dk˙ (0)
dnL
>
=
<
0 ⇔
cˆN
kˆ
rF − ρ
η (rF + β)
− 1
>
=
<
0. (3.9)
In Figure 3 we have drawn the case for which the crowding-out effect is relatively small, so
that the k˙ (t) line shifts to the right at impact. At point A, the per capita stock of capital
starts to increase gradually.
During transition, the economy gradually moves from A to point E1 in the top panel of
Figure 3. Full consumption and financial assets both increase. The increase in full consump-
tion gradually shifts the k˙ (t) line to the left as consumption of non-traded goods crowds out
net investment, i.e. k˙ (t) < 0 there.
In the long run, the economy settles at point E1 in the two panels of Figure 3. The long-
run effect on the capital stock is theoretically ambiguous but the following condition can be
derived:
dk (∞)
dnL
>
=
<
0 ⇔
cˆN
kˆ
rF − ρ
(η + ρ− rF ) (rF + β)
− 1
>
=
<
0. (3.10)
The crowding-out effect is stronger in the long-run than at impact (since rF > ρ) and in
Figure 3 we have drawn the case for which the per capita stock of capital falls in the long
run. For convenience we summarize the results in a proposition.28
Proposition 3 Consider the core model (with α = γ = 0) and assume that −ηdβ = (ρ+ β) dη <
0 so that ηdnL = (η + ρ+ β) dη < 0. The following results can be established: (i) at impact,
x, cT , and cN rise, a, k, and aF are unchanged, x˙ increases and k˙ increases (decreases) if the
cˆN/kˆ ratio is low (high) (see (3.9)); (ii) during transition, x, cT , and cN rise monotonically,
but provided cˆN is strictly positive, the adjustment path for k may be non-monotonic; (iii) in
the new steady state, x, cT , and cN are all increased, and k is increased (decreased) if the
cˆN/kˆ ratio is low (high) (see (3.10)); (iv) the long-run growth rate in the economy falls.
Proof: see text and Bettendorf and Heijdra (2004).
27In the special case, for which aG = aF = 0 initially, this condition can be further simplified to:
dk˙ (0)
dnL
>
=
<
0 ⇔ ωN
ρ+ β
rF + β
− 1
>
=
<
0.
28Of course, items (iv)-(v) of Proposition 2 are also still valid.
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3.3 Pension shocks
In this sub-section we study the macroeconomic effects of shocks in the pension system.
We hold the demographic parameters (β and η) constant and allow for both age-dependent
productivity (α > 0) and a pre-existing pension system (z¯R > 0 so that γ > 0 in (3.7)). Using
(3.7), we find that the x˙ (t) = 0 line can be written as follows:
x (t) =
(
ρ+ β
rF − ρ+ α
)
[ηγ + (α+ η) a (t)] , (3.11)
where the expression for γ is given in (T1.17). The dynamics for full consumption are the
same as before, i.e. full consumption rises (falls) for points above (below) the x˙ (t) = 0
line—see Figure 4.
The first shock we consider is a pension reform, consisting of a decrease in the pension
payment, z¯R. The impact, transitional, and long-run effects of this shock are illustrated in
Figure 4. It follows from (T1.17) that ∂γ/∂z¯R > 0 so that the x˙ (t) = 0 line shifts down, say
from [x˙ (t) = 0]old to [x˙ (t) = 0]new .
29 At impact, the economy jumps from E0 to point A on
the new saddle path SP. Full consumption falls because per capita human wealth declines. In
the bottom panel of Figure 4, the reduction in the consumption of non-traded goods which
occurs at impact boosts net investment and shifts the k˙ (t) line up, say from [k˙ (t)]old to
[k˙ (t)]impact . Immediately following the shock, therefore, the per capita stock of capital starts
to rise, i.e. k˙ (0) > 0 at point A.
During transition, the economy moves along the saddle path from A to the new steady
state at E1. Both full consumption and financial assets increase, but the capital stock declines
in the long run. In the bottom panel, the long-run increase in the consumption of non-
tradeables crowds out net capital accumulation, i.e. the new steady-state equilibrium is at
point E1 which lies to the left of E0.
The second shock affecting the pension system consists of an increase in the pension age, π.
It is shown in the Appendix that ∂γ/∂π < 0, i.e. the adjustment mechanism is qualitatively
exactly the same as the one illustrated in Figure 4. In addition to items (iv)-(vi) of Proposition
2, the key results from this sub-section are as stated in the following proposition.30
Proposition 4 Consider the core model and assume that the pension payment is decreased
(dz¯R < 0) or the retirement age is increased (dπ > 0). The following results can be established:
(i) at impact, x, cT , and cN fall, a, k, and aF are unchanged, and both x˙ and k˙ increase; (ii)
during transition, x, cT , cN and aF rise monotonically, but following its initial increase, k
29Figure 4 is drawn under the assumption that the initial equilibrium occurs in the positive quadrant. If
the pension system is very generous, so that γ is high, it may well be the case that the initial equilibrium is
associated with negative total financial assets.
30Using a one-sector model without investment adjustment costs, Nielsen (1994) finds that a decrease in
z¯R does not affect the capital stock and employment at all, and that an increase in pi increases capital and
employment equi-proportionally. In the latter case, the capital stock features a once-off jump at impact.
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starts to decline during the later phases of adjustment; (iii) in the new steady state, x, cT ,
and cN are all increased, but k is decreased.
Proof: see text and Bettendorf and Heijdra (2004).
4 Welfare effects of pension reform
In sub-section 3.3 we used the core model to study the macroeconomic effects of pension
reform. We found that a decrease in the benefit rate has exactly the same qualitative macroe-
conomic effects as an increase in the pension age—see Proposition 4. In this section we show
that the intergenerational welfare effects associated with the two types of pension reform are
nevertheless different. We continue to restrict attention to the core model in the remainder
of this section.
4.1 Welfare measure
In the core model the welfare measure at time t for a household of vintage v can be written
as:
Λ (v, t) ≡
∫
∞
t
[
ln x¯ (v, τ)− ln PˆC
]
e(ρ+β)(t−τ)dτ
=
ln x¯ (v, t)− ln PˆC
ρ+ β
+
rF − ρ
(ρ+ β)2
, (4.1)
where we have used the Euler equation for full consumption to get from the first to the second
line. Totally differentiating (4.1) yields:
(ρ+ β) dΛ (v, t) = ˜¯x (v, t) , (4.2)
where ˜¯x (v, t) ≡ dx¯ (v, t) /ˆ¯x (v, t) and we use the approximation d ln x¯ (v, t) ≈ ˜¯x (v, t). To eval-
uate (4.2) we distinguish between existing generations (whose generations index is negative,
i.e. v ≤ 0) and future generations (whose index is positive, i.e. v > 0). The time at which
the policy shock occurs is normalized to t = 0.
For existing generations (v ≤ 0) we evaluate the effect of pension reform on their remaining
lifetime utility, i.e. the relevant welfare measure is dΛ (v, 0). It is shown in Bettendorf and
Heijdra (2004) that for both types of policy shocks the change in welfare is given by:
(ρ+ β) dΛ (v, t) = ωH (v) ˜¯a
H (v, 0) , (4.3)
where ωH (v) ≡ ˆ¯a
H (v, 0) /
[
ˆ¯a (v, 0) + ˆ¯aH (v, 0)
]
and ˜¯aH (v, 0) ≡ da¯H (v, 0) /ˆ¯aH (v, 0). Since
asset prices and the interest rate are fixed, the welfare effect is proportional to the proportional
change in human wealth. The share of human wealth in total wealth also features in this
expression because existing generations have had time to accumulate financial assets (i.e.
ˆ¯a (v, 0) is non-zero for v < 0).
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For future generations (v = t > 0) we evaluate the effect on lifetime utility of future
newborns, i.e. the welfare measure is dΛ (t, t). Since newborns enter life without any financial
assets, and there is no transitional dynamics in human wealth, their welfare effect can be
written as:
(ρ+ β) dΛ (t, t) = ˜¯aH (0, 0) . (4.4)
The welfare effects on all (present and future) generations can now be characterized with
the aid of (4.3)-(4.4). The critical ingredients needed for this analysis are ωH (v) and ˜¯a
H (v, 0)
for v ∈ (−∞, 0]. In the next two sub-sections we derive expressions for these components for
the two types of pension reform.
4.2 Reduction in the pension payment
The intergenerational welfare profile associated with a decrease in the pension benefit pay-
ment is illustrated in Figure 5. The intuition behind these effects is as follows. For retired
households the welfare effect can be written as:
(ρ+ β) dΛ(v, 0) = Γ (v) ˜¯zR, (4.5)
where Γ (v) is non-negative and increasing in v (for v ∈ (−∞,−π)). All retired households
loose out as a result of the pension reduction, though less so the older they are. The age-
dependency follows from the fact that financial asset holdings increase with age so that the
share of human wealth in total wealth falls with age. As a result, extremely old generations
do not experience a first-order welfare effect of the pension reduction because to them human
wealth is negligible (i.e. limv→−∞ dΛ(v, 0) = 0).
For working-age generations the welfare effect can still be written as in (4.5) but Γ (v)
is decreasing in v for v ∈ [−π, 0]. Furthermore, it is easy to show that Γ (−π) > 0 and
Γ (0) < 0 so that there exists a critical generation for which members the change in the
pension payment has no first-order welfare effect (i.e. Γ (v∗) = 0). On the one hand members
of this generation receive lower pension payments in the future, but on the other hand the
pension premiums they have to pay until reaching pension age fall as well (and by the same
amount in present-value terms). The age of this critical generation (at time t = 0) is equal
to:
−v∗ ≡
(
rF − nL
rF + β
)
π. (4.6)
Working-age generations older (younger) than the critical generation loose out (gain) as a
result of the pension reform.
For all future generations the welfare effect can be written as (ρ+ β) dΛ(t, t) = Γ (0) ˜¯zR <
0. With the Aaron condition (rF > nL) holding, the PAYG system forces these generations
to save at an implicit rate of return of nL whereas the market rate of return is r
F . Hence, as
30
far as future generations are concerned, the smaller the pension system is, the better off they
are.
The fact that at least some of the generations alive at the time of the shock are better off
as a result of it suggests that it may be possible to obtain a majority in parliament in favour
of pension reform. Indeed, the proportion of the population which favours pension reform (at
time t = 0) is equal to:
L (0)pro
L (0)
= 1− eηv
∗
, (4.7)
where L (0)pro is the population aged between 0 and −v∗ and we have used (2.19) and (4.6).
The reform proposal commands a majority if −ηv∗ > ln 2, or:
η
(
rF − η + β
rF + β
)
π > ln 2. (4.8)
Plugging in some illustrative numbers we find that this condition is not very strict. For
example, setting rF = 0.06, β = 0.01, η = 0.02 (all per annum), we find that the condition
is satisfied provided π > 48.5 years, which is not unreasonable given the implied expected
remaining lifetime of the population of 1/β = 100 years. Of course, in a standard two-
generation Diamond (1965) model the pro-reformers (the young) will always command a
majority provided there is positive population growth. In contrast, in our model it is quite
possible for there to be a majority in favour of reform even if net population growth is
negative. Indeed, if β = 0.02 and η = 0.015, the condition (4.8) is satisfied provided π > 56.8
years. By incorporating a more detailed description of demography, our model allows for
more population heterogeneity and shows more clearly the different mechanisms affecting the
possibility for majoritarian pension reform.
4.3 Increase in the pension age
The intergenerational welfare profile associated with an increase in the pension age is illus-
trated in Figure 6. The key features of this welfare profile are as follows. First, and rather
obviously, all retired generations are unaffected by the pension reform, i.e. dΛ (v, 0) = 0
for v < −π. Second, future generations benefit from the reform since the Aaron condition
holds, i.e. rF > nL. Intuitively, the increase in π decreases the old-age dependency ratio and
effectively makes the distorting PAYG system smaller.
The “generational turbulence” associated with the pension reform hits the working-age
generations. Worst affected are those generations just about to receive their pensions. They
face some additional years during which they are now forced to pay pension premiums whereas
they would have received pension payments had the system not been reformed. The younger of
the working-age generations benefit from the reform because for them its efficiency-enhancing
aspect is relatively more important. Indeed, if rF > nL, the critical generation which just
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breaks even as a result of the reform has a generations index v′:
−v′ ≡
[
1 +
1
(rF − nL)π
ln
(
ε
ε+ (rF − nL)π
)]
π, (4.9)
where −π < v′ < 0 and where ε > 1 is the elasticity of the old-age dependency ratio with
respect to the pension age (defined directly below (2.19)).31
Just as for the first pension shock, the condition for the existence of a parliamentary
majority in favour of reform is quite reasonable.32 For example, holding constant rF = 0.06,
such a majority exists for the parameter settings η = 0.02 and β = 0.01 if π > 54.2 years,
whilst for the settings η = 0.015 and β = 0.02 it exists if π > 66.5 years.
5 Conclusions
We have studied how population ageing and pension reform affect a small open economy with
a non-traded goods sector and with overlapping generations of finite-lived households. Our
main findings have been summarized in a number of propositions throughout the text and
thus need not be restated here. Among other things, the paper highlights the role played
by the non-traded goods sector. By assuming that the investment good is non-tradeable,
physical capital is immobile internationally and there are economy-wide adjustment costs of
investment which give rise to a well-defined investment policy and thus to a finite convergence
31In the special “golden-rule” case with rF = nL, the change in the dependency ratio has no first-order
welfare effect on any generation because the PAYG system is non-distorting.
32Although the pension-age generations are indifferent about this type of pension reform, we implicitly count
them as opponents. We thus understate the support for reform.
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speed in the economy. Interestingly, policies which would lead to additional long-run capital
formation in a closed economy setting (e.g., a reduction in the pension payment), here lead
to crowding out of physical capital even though total assets increase.
The paper can be extended in a number of directions, all of which we plan to pursue in
the near future. First, it would probably be useful to endogenize the household labour supply
decision. In doing so, the model could be used to study the induced-retirement effect stressed
by Feldstein (1974), Kotlikoff (1979), and others. Especially in the context of pension reform
this model extension could significantly affect the conclusions of the present paper.
Second, as we have argued in various places in the paper, a number of famous international
trade theorems, such as the factor-price equalization theorem, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem,
and the Rybczynski theorem, exert a rather dominant effect on the supply side of the model
and on the form of the transitional dynamics. It would be useful to move beyond the rather
special two-goods-two-factors case used in this paper (and in much of the literature), and
to examine the issue of ageing and pension reform in a world in which one or all of these
theorems are no longer valid.33
33Two model extensions spring to mind. First, one can examine the specific-factor model of Jones (1971),
Neary (1978), Mussa (1974), and Mayer (1974). Second, one could examine limited intersectoral capital
mobility, for example due to a concave capital distribution technology in which raw capital is transformed into
sector-specific capital services. See, inter alia, Keller (1980) and Gavin (1991).
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Appendix
In this brief appendix we derive some key results used in the paper. More detailed derivations
are presented in Bettendorf and Heijdra (2004).
Derivation of the aggregate Euler equation
Equation (2.24) can be obtained from (2.23) in the following fashion. Since new genera-
tions are born without any financial assets (a¯(t, t) = 0), it follows from (2.9) that x¯(t, t) =
∆(t)−1a¯H(t, t) so that the generational turnover term in (2.23) can be simplified to:
ηL(t)x¯(t, t)− βX(t)
X(t)
=
ηL(t)a¯H(t, t)− β
[
A(t) +AH(t)
]
∆(t)X(t)
. (A.1)
It is not difficult to show that ηL(t)a¯H(t, t) can be rewritten in terms of aggregate human
wealth plus a term involving parameters of the pension system:
ηL(t)a¯H(t, t) = (α+ η)AH (t)− ηγL(t), (A.2)
where γ is defined in (2.25) above. By using (A.2) in (A.1) and noting (2.21) we find that
the generational turnover term takes the following form:
ηL(t)x¯(t, t)− βX(t)
X(t)
= α+ nL −
ηγL(t) + (α+ η)A(t)
∆(t)X(t)
, (A.3)
where we have used the fact that nL ≡ η − β (see (2.15)). Finally, by substituting (A.3) into
(2.23) we obtain (2.24).
Transitional dynamics in the core model
In order to derive the results for section 3.2, we loglinearize equations (3.6)-(3.8) around an
initial steady state, noting that α = γ = 0 and defining φ ≡ η (ρ+ β):
˙˜
k (t) =
(
yˆN
kˆ
)
n˜N (t)−
(
cˆN
kˆ
)
x˜ (t)− (δ + nL) k˜ (t)− dnL, (A.4)
˙˜x (t) =
(
rF − ρ
) [
x˜ (t)−
1
ωAT
a˜ (t)
]
−
aˆ
xˆ
dφ, (A.5)
˙˜a (t) =
(
rF − nL
)
a˜ (t)−
xˆ
aˆ
ωAT x˜ (t)− ωATdnL, (A.6)
where ωAT ≡ r
F aˆ/
(
nˆT yˆT
)
> 0 and where a variable with a tilde denotes its rate of change
around the initial steady-state, e.g. x˜(t) ≡ dx(t)/xˆ. A variable with a tilde and a dot is
the change in the time derivative expressed in terms of the initial steady-state, for example,
˙˜x(t) ≡ dx˙(t)/xˆ. The only exceptions to that convention refer to the financial assets:
a˜(t) ≡
rFda(t)
nˆT yˆT
, ˙˜a(t) ≡
rFda˙(t)
nˆT yˆT
. (A.7)
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Bettendorf and Heijdra (2004) derive the following reduced-form expression for n˜N (t):
n˜N (t) = −µk˜ (t) , (A.8)
where µ > 0 follows from the factor-intensity assumption (kT > kN ).
In sub-section 3.2.1 we set dη = dβ so that dnL = 0 and dφ = (η + ρ+ β) dη < 0. In sub-
section 3.2.2, we set −ηdβ = (ρ+ β) dη < 0 so that dφ = 0 and ηdnL = (η + ρ+ β) dη < 0.
Consumption-saving dynamics
The (x, a)-system can be written as:[
˙˜x (t)
˙˜a (t)
]
= Π
[
x˜ (t)
a˜ (t)
]
− Γ
[
dnL
dφ
]
, (A.9)
where Π and Γ are defined as:
Π ≡
[
rF − ρ −
(
rF−ρ
ωAT
)
− xˆaˆωAT r
F − nL
]
, Γ ≡
[
0 aˆxˆ
ωAT 0
]
. (A.10)
The characteristic roots of the Jacobian matrix Π are given by −λ1 ≡ −
(
η + ρ− rF
)
< 0
and λ2 ≡ r
F + β > 0 and we note that |Π| = −λ1λ2 < 0.
The long-run effects are obtained by imposing the steady state in (A.9):[
x˜ (∞)
a˜ (∞)
]
= Π−1Γ
[
dnL
dφ
]
=
1
− (η + ρ− rF ) (rF + β)
[
rF − ρ
(
rF − nL
)
aˆ
xˆ(
rF − ρ
)
ωAT ωAT
][
dnL
dφ
]
. (A.11)
Since rF > ρ, a reduction in the population growth rate, increases both x and a in the long
run. Similarly, a reduction in the generational turnover parameter φ, increases x and a since
rF > nL.
The impact effects of the shocks are derived with the aid of Laplace transforms.34 The
impact jump in full consumption is determined by the following condition:
adj [λ2I −Π]
[
x˜ (0)− aˆxˆ
dφ
λ2
−ωAT
dnL
λ2
]
=
[
0
0
]
, (A.12)
where λ2 ≡ r
F + β is the unstable characteristic root and adj [λ2I −Π] is given by:
adj [λ2I −Π] ≡
[
η −
(
rF−ρ
ωAT
)
− xˆaˆωAT ρ+ β
]
. (A.13)
34This method was introduced into economics by Judd (1982). A detailed textbook description of how the
method works is found in Heijdra and van der Ploeg (2002, pp. 678-694).
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Either row of (A.12) can be used to compute x˜ (0):
x˜ (0) =
rF − ρ
η (rF + β)
[
dφ
ρ+ β
− dnL
]
, (A.14)
where we have used the fact that aˆ/xˆ =
(
rF − ρ
)
/ (η (ρ+ β)) to simplify the expression. A
reduction in φ (or an increase in nL) leads to a decrease in full consumption at impact.
The transitional dynamics is dictated by the stable root of the (x, a)-system (−λ1):[
x˜ (t)
a˜ (t)
]
= e−(η+ρ−r
F )t
[
x˜ (0)
0
]
+
[
1− e−(η+ρ−r
F )t
] [ x˜ (∞)
a˜ (∞)
]
. (A.15)
Capital dynamics
By using (A.4) and (A.8) the differential equation for k can be written as:
˙˜
k (t) = −λ3k˜ (t)−
(
cˆN
kˆ
)
x˜ (t)− dnL, (A.16)
where −λ3 ≡ −
(
µyˆN nˆN/kˆ + δ + nL
)
< 0 is the stable root of the investment system. Equa-
tion (A.16) is a stable differential equation with a time-varying forcing term (x˜ (t)) which is
solved subject to the initial condition k˜ (0) = 0. The long-run effect is obtained by imposing
the steady state in (A.16):
k˜ (∞) = −
1
λ3
[(
cˆN
kˆ
)
x˜ (∞) + dnL
]
, (A.17)
where x˜ (∞) is given in (A.11) above.
Using the Laplace transform technique and noting (A.15) we find the following solution
for the transition path:
k˜ (t) =
[
1− e−λ3t
]
k˜ (∞) +
(
cˆN
kˆ
)
[x˜ (∞)− x˜ (0)] T (λ1, λ3, t) , (A.18)
where T (λ1, λ3, t) is a bell-shaped non-negative, and single-peaked temporary transition term
about which the following useful properties can be established.
Lemma A.1 Let T(α1, α2, t) be a single transition function of the form:
T(α1, α2, t) ≡
{
e−α2t−e−α1t
α1−α2
for α1 6= α2
te−α1t for α1 = α2,
with α1 > 0 and α2 > 0. Then T(α1, α2, t) has the following properties: (i) (positive)
T(α1, α2, t) > 0 t ∈ (0,∞), (ii) T(α1, α2, t) = 0 for t = 0 and in the limit as t → ∞,
(iii) (single-peaked) dT(α1, α2, t)/dt > 0 for t ∈ (0, tˆ), dT(α1, α2, t)/dt < 0 for t ∈ (tˆ,∞),
dT(α1, α2, t)/dt = 0 for t = tˆ and in the limit as t → ∞, and dT(α1, α2, 0)/dt = 1, (iv)
tˆ ≡ ln(α1/α2)/(α1 − α2) if α1 6= α2 and tˆ ≡ 1/α1 if α1 = α2; (v) (point of inflexion)
d2T(α1, α2, t)/dt
2 = 0 for t = 2tˆ
Proof : obvious.
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Dynamics and pension shocks
In order to derive the results for section 3.3, we hold η and β constant (so that dnL = dφ = 0),
and note that α ≥ 0 and z¯R > 0. Apart from the fact that dnL = 0, equations (A.4) and
(A.6) are unaffected but (A.5) is changed to:
˙˜x (t) =
(
rF − ρ+ α
) [
x˜ (t)−
ζ
ωAT
a˜ (t)− (1− ζ) γ˜
]
, (A.19)
where φ ≡ (α+ η) (ρ+ β) and ζ is defined as:
0 < ζ ≡
φaˆ
φaˆ+ (ρ+ β) ηγ
< 1. (A.20)
Following the same steps as before we find that the characteristic roots of the consumption-
saving system are −λ1 ≡ −
(
η + ρ− rF
)
< 0 and λ2 ≡ r
F +α+β > 0, and that the transition
path following a pension shock is given by (A.15) with:
x˜ (0) =
(1− ζ)
(
rF − ρ+ α
)
rF + α+ β
γ˜, (A.21)[
x˜ (∞)
a˜ (∞)
]
=
(1− ζ)
(
rF − ρ+ α
)
− (η + ρ− rF ) (rF + α+ β)
[
rF − nL
xˆ
aˆωAT
]
γ˜. (A.22)
The transition path for the per capita capital stock still takes the form as given in (A.18).
Comparative static effects for γ
The pension-related term γ is defined in (2.25) above. We write it as follows:
γ ≡
(
1
1− e−ηπ
)(
z¯R
rF + β
)(
rF + α+ β
)(e−ηπ − e−(rF+β)π
rF + β − η
)
> 0, (A.23)
where we have used the fact that nL ≡ η − β. The partial derivative with respect to z¯R
is straightforward: ∂γ/∂z¯R = γ/z¯R > 0. The partial derivatives for η, β, and π are more
complicated.
Birth rate
For the birth rate we find:
∂ηγ
∂η
= ηγπ
[
Ψ [ηπ]−Ψ
[(
η − rF − β
)
π
] ]
< 0, (A.24)
where Ψ (x) is defined as follows:
Ψ (x) ≡
1
x
−
1
ex − 1
. (A.25)
The following Lemma establishes some important properties of Ψ (x).
37
Lemma A.2 Let Ψ(x) ≡ 1x −
1
ex−1 . Then: (i) Ψ(x) > 0; (ii) Ψ
′(x) < 0, ∀x.
Proof : See Bettendorf and Heijdra (2004).
Lemma A.2 establishes that Ψ (x) is a decreasing function. Since ηπ <
(
η − rF − β
)
π,
the inequality in (A.24) follows readily.
Death rate
After some steps, we find that the derivative of γ with respect to the mortality rate β is:
∂γ
∂β
= −γ
[
πΨ
[(
rF + β − η
)
π
]
+
α
(rF + β + α) (rF + β)
]
< 0, (A.26)
where the sign follows from the fact that Ψ (x) > 0,∀x (see Lemma A.2(i)). Hence, γ is a
downward sloping function of the death rate, β.
Pension age
Finally, the derivative with respect to the pension age can be written as follows.
∂γ
∂π
≡
(
z¯R
rF + β − η
)(
rF + α+ β
rF + β
)
∂
∂π
(
1− e−(r
F+β−η)π
eηπ − 1
)
, (A.27)
with:
∂ (·)
∂π
=
e−(r
F+β−η)π (rF + β) ηπ
(eηπ − 1)2
[
Ξ [ηπ]− Ξ
[(
rF + β
)
π
] ]
. (A.28)
The Ξ (x) function is defined as follows:
Ξ (x) ≡
ex − 1
x
> 0, for x ≥ 0. (A.29)
It is straightforward to verify that Ξ′(x) > 0 for x ≥ 0. It follows from (A.28) that:
∂ (·)
∂π
<
=
>
0 ⇔ rF
>
=
<
η − β [≡ nL] . (A.30)
Hence, it follows from (A.27) that:
∂γ
∂π
≡
(
z¯R
rF + β − η
)(
rF + α+ β
rF + β
)
∂ (·)
∂π
< 0, (A.31)
since rF + β − η has the opposite sign of ∂ (·) /∂π. Hence, γ decreases with the pension age
π.
38
References
Armington, P. S. (1969). A theory of demand for products distinguished by place of produc-
tion. IMF Staff Papers, 16:159–178.
Auerbach, A., Kotlikoff, L., Hagemann, R., and Nicoletti, G. (1989). The economic dynamics
of an aging population: The case of four OECD countries. OECD Economic Studies,
12:97–130.
Auerbach, A. J., Cai, J., and Kotlikoff, L. J. (1991). U.S. demographics and saving: Predic-
tions of three savings models. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy,
34:135–156.
Auerbach, A. J. and Kotlikoff, L. J. (1987). Dynamic Fiscal Policy. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge.
Bettendorf, L. J. H. and Heijdra, B. J. (2004). Population ageing and pen-
sion reform in a small open economy with non-traded goods: Mathemati-
cal Appendix. Unpublished Paper, University of Groningen. Download from:
http://www.eco.rug.nl/medewerk/heijdra/leon4app.pdf.
Blanchard, O.-J. (1985). Debts, deficits, and finite horizons. Journal of Political Economy,
93:223–247.
Bovenberg, A. L. (1993). Investment promoting policies in open economies: The importance
of intergenerational and international distributional effects. Journal of Public Economics,
51:3–54.
Brock, P. L. and Turnovsky, S. J. (1994). The dependent economy model with both traded
and nontraded capital goods. Review of International Economics, 2:306–201.
Broer, D. P. (2001). Growth and welfare distribution in an ageing society: An applied general
equilibrium analysis for the Netherlands. De Economist, 149:81–114.
Buiter, W. H. (1988). Death, birth, productivity growth and debt neutrality. Economic
Journal, 98:279–293.
Cutler, D. M., Poterba, J. M., Sheiner, L. M., and Summers, L. H. (1990). An aging society:
Opportunity or challenge? Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1–73.
Diamond, P. A. (1965). National debt in a neoclassical growth model. American Economic
Review, 55:1126–1150.
Feldstein, M. S. (1974). Social security, induced retirement, and aggregate capital accumula-
tion. Journal of Political Economy, 82:905–926.
39
Gavin, M. (1991). Tariffs and the current account: On the macroeconomics of commercial
policy. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 15:27–52.
Gertler, M. (1999). Government debt and social security in a life-cycle model. Carnegie-
Rochester Series on Public Policy, 50:61–117.
Giovannini, A. (1988). The real exchange rate, the capital stock, and fiscal policy. European
Economic Review, 32:1747–1767.
Heijdra, B. J. and van der Ploeg, F. (2002). Foundations of Modern Macroeconomics. Oxford
University Press, Oxford.
Hsieh, Y.-N., Chang, W.-Y., and Lai, C.-C. (1998). Endogenizing labor-leisure choice: In-
vestment and the relative price of non-traded goods. Economic Letters, 60:105–111.
Hubbard, R. G. and Judd, K. L. (1987). Social security and individual welfare: Precautionary
saving, borrowing constraints, and the payroll tax. American Economic Review, 77:630–
646.
Jones, R. W. (1971). A three-factor model in theory, trade, and history. In Bhagwati, J. N.,
Jones, R. W., Mundell, R., and Vanek, J., editors, Trade, Balance of Payments, and
Growth. North-Holland, Amsterdam.
Judd, K. L. (1982). An alternative to steady-state comparisons in perfect foresight models.
Economics Letters, 10:55–59.
Keller, W. J. (1980). Tax Incidence: A General Equilibrium Approach. North-Holland,
Amsterdam.
Kotlikoff, L. J. (1979). Social security and equilibrium capital intensity. Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 93:233–253.
Lee, R. (2003). The demographic transition: Three centuries of fundamental change. Journal
of Economic Perspectives, 17:167–190.
Mayer, W. (1974). Short-run and long-run equilibrium for a small open economy. Journal of
Political Economy, 82:955–968.
Mussa, M. (1974). Tariffs and the distribution of income: The importance of factor specificity,
substitutability, and intensity in the short and long-run. Journal of Political Economy,
82:1191–1204.
Neary, J. P. (1978). Short-run capital specificity and the pure theory of international trade.
Economic Journal, 88:488–510.
40
Nielsen, S. B. (1994). Social security and foreign indebtedness in a small open economy. Open
Economies Review, 5:47–63.
Turnovsky, S. J. (1997). International Macroeconomic Dynamics. MIT Press, Cambridge,
MA.
United Nations (2003). World Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision Population Database.
Link: http://www.un.org/esa/population/unpop.htm.
van Wincoop, E. (1993). Structural adjustment and the construction sector. European Eco-
nomic Review, 37:177–201.
Weil, P. (1989). Overlapping families of infinite-lived agents. Journal of Public Economics,
38:183–198.
Woodland, A. D. (1982). International Trade and Resource Allocation. North-Holland, Am-
sterdam.
Yaari, M. E. (1965). Uncertain lifetime, life insurance, and the theory of the consumer. Review
of Economic Studies, 32:137–150.
